Acknowledgements
This PP-Configuration was developed by the iTC for Application Software international Technical Community (iTC) also known as AppSW-iTC with representatives from Industry, Government agencies, Common Criteria Test Laboratories, and members of academia.
Revision History
| Version | Date | Description |
|---|---|---|
1.0 |
2022-04-06 |
Initial Release |
1.0e |
2024-02-15 |
Incorporated feedback received following initial release. |
2.0 |
2026-07-21 |
Draft-review updates. |
1. Introduction
1.1. PP-Configuration Overview
The purpose of a PP-Configuration is to combine Protection Profiles (PPs) and PP-Modules for various technology types into a single configuration that can be evaluated as a whole.
This PP-Configuration is for enterprise server applications.
A TOE with separately deployed instances of multiple distinct TOE Components that collectively provide the TOE security functionality shall use the PP-Configuration for Enterprise Server Applications and Agent/Application Component(s) when its component relationships satisfy the Agent Module’s registration, enablement, disablement, and protected-communication model. Multiple deployed instances of the same TOE Component are Runtime Replicas when they meet the base cPP definition and do not, by themselves, trigger this requirement. This Server-only PP-Configuration does not define an alternative distributed-TOE allocation path; a distributed product that does not fit the Agent Module control model requires another approved PP-Configuration or iTC guidance.
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A TOE Component is a named, logical, separately deployable portion of the TOE that is identified in the ST and mapped to the base cPP, applicable PP-Modules, and relevant SFRs (Section 1.2.2, Technical Terms, and Section 1.5, Distributed and Microservices TOE Architectures).
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TOE Component Instance, Runtime Replica, and Communication Relationship Type are defined in Section 1.2.2, Technical Terms.
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In Figure 2, each S-1 through S-n or A-1 through A-n box is a TOE Component Instance; its connected TOE Component box identifies the logical TOE Component; qualifying instances of the same TOE Component are Runtime Replicas; and R1 denotes a Communication Relationship Type.
The following figures illustrate this applicability rule. They are explanatory; the conformance text and the requirements in the claimed PP-Configuration components control.
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Note
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Only TOE Components inside the TOE boundary count toward this applicability decision. Server and Agent are PP-Configuration roles; they do not imply communication direction, hosting relationship, or privilege. One relationship line in the topology figure represents a Communication Relationship Type rather than every runtime connection between replicas. |
A Server Application payload executing in a Linux container remains subject to the base cPP and Supporting Document guidance for Linux Running-Payload Activities, including separate artifact, update-lifecycle, runtime or orchestrator dependency, and external-interface or channel coverage at the layer stated by each EA.
1.2. PP-Configuration Reference
This PP-Configuration is identified as follows:
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PP-Configuration for Enterprise Server Applications, Version 2.0, 2026-07-21
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As a shorthand reference, it can be identified as "CFG_APP-Server_V2.0"
1.3. PP-Configuration Components
This PP-Configuration includes the following components:
[base PP] |
cPP_APP_SW_V2.0 |
[PP-Module 1] |
MOD_Server_v2.0 |
2. Conformance Claims
2.1. CC Statement
To be conformant to this PP-Configuration, an ST must demonstrate Exact Conformance as defined by CC:2022.
2.2. CC Conformance Claims
This PP-Configuration, and its components specified in section 1.3, are conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (conformant) of Common Criteria CC:2022, Revision 1 [CC].
3. SAR Statement
The set of SARs specified for this PP-Configuration are taken from, and identical to, those specified in the base PP.
3.1. Related Documents
Common Criteria[1]
[CC1] |
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, |
[CC2] |
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, |
[CC3] |
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, |
[CEM] |
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, |
[ERR] |
Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release 1), |